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Abstract
Surrogate motherhood is a highly debated issue, and one for which there is now 
considerable case law. However, adequate protection for the multiple interests at 
stake has yet to be offered, especially in those legal systems in which lawmakers 
have been slow in intervening, or dig in behind absolute prohibitions unable to 
stem the phenomenon of procreative tourism. This contribution reconstructs 
the position of the ECtHR and of Italy’s Constitutional Court and Court of 
Cassation in their most recent rulings, with the aim of understanding the diverse 
approaches taken to identify the best interests of the child.
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Introduction
Surrogate motherhood is an issue widely debated in jurisprudence, from 
a variety of standpoints: moral, philosophical, ethical, sociological, and 
juridical. In fact, surrogacy calls into question the role of women and the 
meaning of motherhood – which is to say the original bond between the 
person coming into the world, and the person bringing someone into the 
world (Poli 2015, 7-28).
Juridically, this phenomenon touches on various values and interests, all 
worthy of protection: above all, the interest of the child conceived through 
surrogacy in knowing his or her origins, but also in being accepted within 
society with no conditioning connected to his or her birth, and to the fact 
that his or her abandonment had already been planned prior to conception 
(Ergas 2013; Gerber and O’Byrne 2015).
We must then ask whether this practice may be considered compatible with 
full respect for women’s health and dignity: in fact, the pregnant woman is 
not always adequately informed of the health risks, especially in the case 
of people with low levels of education, or who live in developing countries 
(Sgorbati 2016, 111-129). Moreover, there is a clear risk of exploitation of 
women by partners, family members, and unscrupulous organizations: what 
is sometimes presented as a woman’s autonomous choice can thus become 
an object of exploitation and commodification of female body.
Part of the legal literature holds that not even ‘altruistic’ surrogacy respects 
women’s dignity: when a woman undergoes a pregnancy she is taking part 
in it with her own personality and intelligence that can never be surrogated, 
because otherwise the generative component of human nature would be 
degraded (Niccolai 2017, 2990-3000; Pezzini 2017 holds otherwise).
There is also the interest of those who, while unable to have children, do 
not wish to renounce parenthood, holding that nature cannot stand in the 
way of their dreams, but thus going so far as to implement behaviour in 
breach of the prohibitions put in place by lawmakers.
However, like all complex issues, given the multiple interests involved and 
its many implications, it is destined to continue prompting new reflections. 
It is therefore a subject that lawmakers have struggled or been slow to deal 
with, also because the possibilities for surrogacy that can take place differ 
greatly: consequently, doubts as to legitimacy would arise if a single juridical 
regime were adopted. On the other hand, regulations governing surrogacy 
might be unable to adequately cover the different cases that may take place; 
any preclusions that are introduced might be circumventable, or hard to 
prosecute, or such as to raise doubts as to their constitutionality, because 
they may be likened to cases that are in fact permitted.
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These difficulties are heightened by the lack of regulation on an 
international level (Trimmings and Beaumont 2011, 633-647): even if States 
would maintain their freedom as to whether or not to adhere to a regulatory 
regime setting down at least certain common principles, it is clear that a 
total absence of rules raises additional complications when intended parents 
in a country that does not permit or that strongly limits surrogacy, in order 
to realize their parenthood plan, visit another country where surrogacy is 
allowed.
The absence of regulation (or the dearth of adequate regulation) requires 
case law to deal with and resolve cases that may take place with ever-
increasing frequency, leading among other things to additional problems 
especially because, at the various levels of appeal, very different perspectives 
may be adopted; decisions may consequently be overturned or proceedings 
extended over time, with inevitable repercussions above all in terms of 
protecting the interests of the child.
In recent years, multiple interventions by domestic and international 
courts have focused increasingly, in their reconstructions and decisions, on 
the primacy of the interests of the child, although quite often this is invoked 
as irrefutable grounds, but without analysing it in its multiple components.
The latest rulings by the European Court of Human Rights and by domestic 
courts show the diversity in balancing the best interests of the child with the 
other interests and values worthy of protection. This contribution aims to 
examine where case law has come down on the issue of surrogacy in order 
to comprehend the reasons for these differences. In particular, attention 
will focus above all on the recent opinion expressed by the ECtHR, and the 
subsequent decision of the united sections of the Court of Cassation which 
appears in fact aimed at containing the openings provided by the former, as 
well as by the Constitutional Court.
Analysis of the various rulings provides the basis for seeking to define the 
current status of protection for the child born through surrogate motherhood, 
with the purpose of comprehending the necessary steps that have yet to be 
taken.
1. Surrogate Motherhood in ECtHR Rulings
Recently, the ECtHR was called upon to express an opinion1 on the basis 
of Protocol No. 16 attached to the European Convention on Human Rights – 
1 Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child 
relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and 
the intended mother, of 10 April 2019, request No. P16-2018-001.
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which entered force on 01 August 2018 in the States that ratified it – on the 
matter of surrogate motherhood.
Said Protocol (Paprocka and Ziólkowski 2015) allows the highest courts of 
the contracting states to ask the ECtHR for non-binding, advisory opinions 
on questions of principle related to the interpretation or application of the 
rights and freedoms defined by the Convention or by its Protocols. France’s 
ratification allowed Protocol No. 16 to enter force, and France was the first 
to request an advisory opinion by virtue of a ruling of the plenary assembly 
of the French Court of Cassation on 5 October 20182.
The ECtHR’s opinion further defines the principles to be taken into account 
in dealing with the issue of surrogate motherhood, and takes on importance 
for all the state parties3 that cannot ignore this new ruling, because it is the 
ECtHR that is responsible for interpreting the Convention, making it a living 
instrument to be applied in light of the needs of a modern democratic society 
and of scientific and social evolution4.
Before examining the content of the opinion, account must briefly be taken 
of past ECtHR case law in the matter of surrogate motherhood, in order to 
better understand the reasons for this new arrêt by the Strasbourg Court.
1.1. Some Recent ECtHR Decisions
1.1.1. The Mennesson and Labassee Decisions
The first decisions to take into consideration are those relating to the 
Mennesson v� France5 and Labassee v� France6 cases (d’Avout 2014). In both 
rulings, the ECtHR dealt indirectly with the issue of surrogate motherhood, 
having to pronounce its opinion on the refusal in France to register birth 
certificates drawn up abroad. The events regarded two French couples who 
had used surrogacy in the United States and were unable to enter the foreign 
birth certificates into the French registers of births, marriages and deaths, as 
2 The request was judged admissible on 03 December 2018, and the question was thus 
assigned to the Grand Chamber.
3 The interest of certain states – the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and Ireland – 
other than France, that have yet to ratify Protocol No. 16, is shown by the fact that they (like 
other parties) have submitted some observations in the context of this procedure.
4 ‘The Convention is a living instrument which […] must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions’ (ECtHR, Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, decision of 25 April 1978, 
Application No. 5856/72, § 31) and ‘the notions currently prevailing in democratic States’ 
(ECtHR, Guzzardi v. Italia, decision of 6 November 1980, Application No. 7367/76, § 95). ‘The 
need for appropriate legal measures should therefore be kept under review having regard 
particularly to scientific and societal developments’ (ECtHR, Rees v. The United Kingdom, 
decision of 17 October 1986, Application No. 9532/81, § 47).
5 ECtHR, sect. V, decision of 26 June 2014, Application No. 65192/11.
6 ECtHR, sect. V, decision of 26 June 2014, Application No. 65941/11.
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a result of the prohibition against surrogacy established in their country. In 
both cases, the egg was from an anonymous donor, while the male gametes 
were from the spouse.
The Court found this refusal to be illegitimate interference, because it 
was disproportionate to the purpose of safeguarding the principle of non-
disposability of the person upon which the express prohibition of gestational 
surrogacy is based. In fact, refusing to enter the birth certificate brings very 
serious consequences: the situation of juridical clandestinity prevents the 
child from acquiring a French passport and nationality. It also raises risk in 
connection with the ability to stay on the State’s territory, and a whole series 
of potentially highly damaging civil-law consequences.
In examining the legitimacy of the interference of French authorities within 
a democratic society, the ECtHR – while recognizing the broad margins 
of appreciation available to the individual States – found it had to protect 
the parent-child relationship as an expression of the children’s private life, 
thereby affirming the primacy of biological parenthood as an inescapable 
component of the identity of each individual.
The Strasbourg Court therefore established the obligation for the 
contracting states to recognize the status of a child born legally abroad 
through a surrogacy arrangement by virtue of the right to respect for private 
life pursuant to art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (but not 
also the right to respect for family life), since this prerogative implies the 
right of each individual to establish the details of his or her own identity as 
human being, including the parent-child relationship. This is to say the Court 
accorded a broad discretionary margin of appreciation to the individual 
States on the issue of surrogate motherhood given the delicate ethical 
content, while recognizing, however, that this margin was exceeded in the 
event of refusal of legal recognition of the parent-child relationship between 
the child and the intended father when the latter is also the biological father.
1.1.2. The Paradiso/Campanelli Decisions
In Paradiso and Campanelli v� Italia7, however, the ECtHR dealt with the 
issue of surrogacy in the absence of a biological link between the intended 
parents and the child. In fact, the proceedings arose from the refusal to 
register the birth certificate of a child born in Russia following a surrogacy 
arrangement, on the grounds of violation of public law due to alteration of 
registry status, since the two applicant spouses were falsely registered as the 
child’s parents on the birth certificate.
7 ECtHR, sect. II, decision of 27 January 2015, Application No. 25358/12.
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In deciding the case, the Court devoted particular attention to the interests 
of the child and to protecting his personal identity. The Court dwelled on 
the child’s removal from the aspiring parents, ordered by the Italian judges, 
confirming the importance of de facto family bonds in the context of the 
protections established by art. 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which, in this case, was violated by the Italian authorities despite 
this being a case of surrogacy. Moreover, the Court underscored that the 
child’s right to have his identity recognized was strongly compromised by 
the fact that he remained without identity for more than two years, which is 
to say until the Court of Appeal – ruling on the refusal to register the foreign 
birth certificate, and having found said refusal legitimate given the falsity of 
said certificate – upheld the prosecutor’s application to draw up a new birth 
certificate in which the child was to be indicated as the child of unknown 
parties, and was to be given a new name. Precisely this situation brought 
very serious consequences in terms of nationality and the right to a name, of 
fundamental importance for the individual’s identity.
Going on to examine the child’s removal from his intended parents, the 
Court affirmed that this solution must always be considered an extreme 
measure to which recourse only where the child is faced with grave and 
immediate danger, as account must also be taken of the removal’s effects on 
the parents’ private and family life (§ 80). In particular, the judges considered 
unjustified, especially in the absence of a definitive decision in a criminal 
court setting, the opinion of the Italian authorities which, without any 
technical verification, deemed the applicant spouses unable to raise and love 
the child because, although they had been granted authorization to adopt in 
2006, they had acted in violation of the relevant regulations (§§ 83-84). The 
Court, in this part of its decision, reveals its view that the Italian authorities 
should have permitted adoption by the applicant couple (Lenti 2015, 473).
The Court thus found that the removal ordered by the Italian authorities 
contravened art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because 
it was a case of illegitimate interference prohibited by that provision, given 
the harmful consequences to the child’s personal identity. This confirmed its 
orientation towards considering de facto family bonds (regardless, then, of 
biological ones) as subject to the guarantees established by the cited article, 
because it is an orientation functional to and consistent with the principle of 
the best interests of the child.
Italy then requested to refer the case to the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court, which overturned the outcome of the judgment8. In fact, the Grand 
Chamber ruled out that the bond established between the applicant couple 
8 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, decision of 24 January 2017, Application No. 25358/12.
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and the child born to a surrogate mother was de facto ‘family life’ for the 
purposes of application of art. 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on two grounds: the lack of a biological tie between the spouses and 
the child, and the short duration of the relationship with the child, marked 
also by legal uncertainty due to the two spouses’ unlawful behaviour (§§ 
151-158).
The Grand Chamber then deemed art. 8 of the Convention applicable with 
a view to protecting the applicants’ ‘private life’ by virtue of the spouses’ 
precise intention to become parents and the legitimate expectation for 
the applicants’ personal development (§§ 161-165). From this perspective, 
the measures to remove the minor child adopted by the Italian authorities 
constituted interference in the applicants’ private life unless this interference 
could be justified as expressly provided for by law for pursuing one or more 
of the aims listed in paragraph 2 of art. 8 of the Convention.
The Grand Chamber thus held that in the case in point, the immediate and 
irreversible separation from the minor child certainly had an impact on the 
applicants’ private life. However, this interference was justified since it was 
provided for by law and necessary for the protection of a higher interest, 
identified as the priority need to protect the child, and there was therefore 
no breach of art. 8 of the Convention. The measures taken by the Italian 
authorities were deemed proportionate to the child’s priority interest and 
indispensable to avoid considering as legitimate a situation created in breach 
of important rules of domestic law: therefore, the Italian judges guaranteed a 
fair balance between the different interests at stake, while remaining within 
the limits of the wide margin of appreciation available to them in the present 
case (§ 215).
1.1.3. The Primacy of the Best Interests of the Child
These recent rulings all revolve around the principle of the best interests of 
the child, recognizing that this principle prevails over the collective interest, 
over the certainty of family ties, and ultimately over biological ties as well.
There are certain aspects that I think bear stressing: the ECtHR, although 
it had to rule on the practical case, in referring to the principles and interests 
to be protected, always considers those of the intended parents and the 
best interests of the child, but without taking account of the protection of 
the woman bringing the pregnancy to term, and of her dignity. It is as if 
this aspect were included in the assessments of the individual States at the 
moment when each decides, at its own discretion, whether to forbid or allow 
surrogacy, and were then of no relevance whatsoever once the child was 
born and his or her status was to be decided upon.
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Moreover, the best interests of the child are continuously invoked for 
their value prevailing over the other principles, and are used as a counter-
limit to public order (Tonolo 2015, 207), but without seeking to define their 
particularly complex content.
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights during the 2014-
2017 period therefore seems to arrive at these conclusions: the minor child’s 
higher interest may be deemed as met when a biological tie with at least 
one parent and a well-established parental relationship coexist, since in this 
case the parent-child relationship may also be recognized for the intended 
mother with whom there is no biological tie with the child. Conversely, in 
the absence of a genetic tie between the adults and the child, also taking 
account of the brief duration of the relationship and of the uncertainty of 
the legal relationships arising from unlawful conduct, no de facto family 
life based on art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be 
recognized.
The referral for consultation brought by the French Court of Cassation 
rests on these bases.
1.2. The First Opinion Rendered by the ECtHR Based on Protocol 
No. 16
1.2.1. The Question Raised by the French Court of Cassation
The French Court of Cassation, with the request for an opinion addressed to 
the ECtHR, intended to urge the latter court to make some specifications on 
the effects of past rulings in the matter of surrogate motherhood. The opinion, 
moreover, was requested precisely in the context of the re-examination of 
the Mennesson case made possible by virtue of an intervention by French 
lawmakers allowing the judgments to be reviewed following a ruling against 
the State by the ECtHR.
After the Mennesson and Labassee decisions, the national case-law 
orientation changed because the existence of a surrogacy arrangement was 
no longer understood as an absolute impediment to entering a foreign birth 
certificate into the French registers of births, marriages and deaths, provided 
that the certificate was not forged or irregular, and that the facts declared 
therein corresponded with biological reality. Therefore, the intended father 
– when he is also the biological father – may ask for the registration of the 
birth certificate of the child born through surrogacy, stating the parent-child 
relationship with the father.
However, according to the French Court of Cassation, the ECtHR provided 
no indications on the position of the intended mother with whom there is no 
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biological link, and above all on the State’s obligations. In other words, the 
French Court of Cassation asked to define the State’s margin of appreciation 
with regard to two choices: permitting the registration of the foreign birth 
certificate of the child conceived through surrogacy, or implementing the 
principle of mater semper certa, especially when there is no biological link 
between the intended mother and the child.
The French Court therefore brought two requests before the ECtHR: in the 
first place, it asked whether the margin of appreciation available to the State 
pursuant to art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights included 
the possibility of refusing to register a birth certificate of a child born abroad 
through surrogacy, when the intended mother is indicated as legal mother, 
while accepting registration insofar as the certificate designates the father 
with whom there is a biological link. In this case, it found it necessary to 
clarify whether distinctions ought to be made depending on whether or not 
the intended mother’s genetic material is used in the fecundation process.
In the second place, the French Court of Cassation asked whether, in the 
event of an affirmative answer, the possibility for the intended mother to 
establish a mother-child relationship by adopting the child of her spouse 
– the biological father – might allow the State to comply with art. 8 of 
theEuropean Convention on Human Rights.
As may be noted, the French court, most likely lacking adequate domestic 
regulation, asks for guidance and poses these very stringent queries, also 
with a view to possible new and different real-life cases, as if wishing to 
encourage the ECtHR to provide a clear definition of the boundaries of the 
domestic margin of appreciation. It is as if the French Court of Cassation 
wished to entrust the definition of the practical case to the Strasbourg Court. 
In fact, in its response, although the Court seeks to contain its opinion within 
the boundaries outlined by Protocol No. 16, it is not always successful in 
doing so.
1.2.2. The ECtHR’s Opinion
Before dealing with the issue, the ECtHR reconstructs the situation 
existing in forty-three States Parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (not including France), and notes that surrogacy arrangements are 
permitted in nine of them, and tolerated in a further ten, while they are 
explicitly or implicitly prohibited in twenty-four States. In most countries 
(thirty-one, including twelve where the practice is prohibited), the father’s 
paternity may be recognized when his biological material has been used. In 
nineteen countries (including seven that prohibit surrogacy arrangements), 
the intended mother can establish maternity even if there is no genetic link: 
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however, the procedure for establishing this status varies in the various legal 
systems (§§ 23-24)9.
Moreover, the ECtHR specifies that, following the entry into force 
of Protocol 16, it is now allowed to express an opinion with reference to 
questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, without transferring the domestic 
dispute to the Court. Consequently, it has no jurisdiction to assess the facts 
or the parties’ arguments, since it is for the domestic courts to draw from 
the opinion the conclusions necessary for resolving the case (§25). In fact, 
the Court stresses that the opinions it delivers must be confined to points 
that are directly connected to the proceedings pending at domestic level 
(Protocol No. 16, art. 1, § 2); the added value of the opinions lies in offering 
an interpretative aid to the domestic court – and in my opinion to any State 
Party – for similar cases as well (§ 26).
After this, the ECtHR goes on to define the scope of the opinion, observing 
that the dispute before the court regards a case of surrogacy in which the 
intended mother’s biological material was not used. As a consequence, 
the Court restricts the sphere of its own ruling because the opinion 
cannot address the case – additionally set out in the first query – of using 
the intended mother’s biological material in the gestational surrogacy 
arrangement (§§ 27-30). The Court’s specification gives reason to believe 
that, in the event of surrogacy arrangements using the intended mother’s 
gametes, the conclusions might be different: in any event, as we shall see, 
although the Court declares it cannot rule on this case, it then manages to 
refer to it, thereby providing an additional opening.
The response to the first query focused on two elements deemed 
fundamental by the Court: the best interests of the child and the margin of 
appreciation available to the States (§ 37). As regards the first parameter, 
the Court refers to its own case law, in which it affirmed that this value is 
paramount (§ 38).
First of all, the Court refers to the Mennesson and Labassee decisions, in 
which it had the opportunity to observe that a State might wish to deter 
its nationals from going abroad to take advantage of methods of assisted 
9 Registration of the foreign birth certificate is possible in sixteen of the nineteen states 
that permit or tolerate surrogacy arrangements, and in seven of the twenty-four countries 
that prohibit it, provided that the certificate indicates an intended parent with a biological 
link with the child. A parent-child relationship can be established or recognized in court 
proceedings not involving adoption in the nineteen countries that permit or tolerate 
surrogacy arrangements, and in nine of the twenty-four countries that prohibit them. 
Moreover, adoption by the parent with no genetic links with the child is possible in five of 
the countries that permit or tolerate surrogacy arrangements, and in twelve of the twenty-
four countries that prohibit them.
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reproduction that are prohibited on its own territory. Nevertheless, 
it observed that the effects of the non-recognition of the parent-child 
relationship between children thus conceived and the intended parents 
were not limited to the parents alone, but they also affected the children 
themselves, whose right to respect for their private life was substantially 
impacted, with negative effects especially on respect for their private life; if 
the parent-child relationship were to remain uncertain, the children would 
encounter difficulties, for example, in accessing their own nationality, in 
maintaining residence with the mother, and in inheritance rights (§§ 39-
40).
The Court holds that the best interests of the child do not reside only in 
the protection of the right to private and personal life, because account 
must be taken of other elements – such as the right to know one’s origins 
and the need to be protected from abuse – that do not weigh in favour 
of recognition of the parent-child relationship with intended parents (§ 
41). Nevertheless, giving primary importance to the interests of the child 
also involves identifying persons responsible for his or her growth and 
upbringing, as well as the possibility for the child to live and develop in a 
stable environment.
In light of all these considerations, the Court finds that a general and 
absolute impossibility of establishing the parent-child relationship with the 
intended mother is in fact incompatible with the best interests of the child. 
A careful examination must therefore be made in the light of the particular 
circumstances of the case (§ 42).
As to the margin of appreciation, the Court observes – as already specified 
in the Mennesson and Labassee decisions – that these are sensitive ethical 
and moral issues involving multiple interests: for these reasons, the margin 
of appreciation must be wide, also because there is no consensus on the 
issue of surrogacy (§ 43). However, when a particularly important facet of 
a person’s identity is at stake, such as when legal parent-child relationship 
is concerned, the margin must be restricted (§ 44): this applies with greater 
force in this case because other essential aspects of personal identity come 
into play, such as determining the environment in which the child must live, 
and the persons responsible for his or her development (§ 45).
The ECtHR, after these premises with which it intended to establish a clear 
primacy of the interests of the child, goes on to examining the two queries. 
As to the first, it finds that, given the best interests of the child and the 
reduced margin of appreciation available to the State, domestic law must 
provide a possibility of recognition of the parent-child relationship of a child 
born abroad through a surrogacy arrangement with the intended mother, 
designated in the foreign birth certificate as the ‘legal mother’ (§ 46). After 
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this, not taking account of what was preliminarily declared, the Court states 
that although this is not the case in this matter, the possibility of recognizing 
this relationship appears even more necessary when the surrogacy procedure 
has used the intended mother’s biological material (§ 47).
As to the second query, it is certainly in the child’s interests for the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal relationship with his or her intended 
mother to be as short-lived as possible, because otherwise the child is in 
a vulnerable position with regard to several aspects of his or her right to 
respect for private life (§ 49). However, according to the Court, this does 
not mean that States are obliged to opt for registration of the details of birth 
certificates established abroad (§ 50).
The Court observes that the procedures, where the establishment of a 
relationship between the child and the intended parent is possible, vary 
from one country to another, and finds that the choice of permitting this 
recognition falls within the States’ margin of appreciation (§ 51). Therefore, 
art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not impose an 
obligation to recognize ab initio a parent-child relationship between the 
child and the intended mother, but only when this becomes a practical 
reality, and it is for the national authorities to make this judgment (§ 52). 
One solution for recognizing this relationship is, for example, adoption (§ 
53), provided that the procedure enables a decision to be taken rapidly, and 
the competent national authority assess the child’s best interest in the light 
of the circumstances of the case (§§ 54-55). In particular, the Court does not 
require an ad hoc procedure introduced to regulate these cases connected to 
surrogacy: what is important is for the procedure to be carried out promptly 
to reduce the time of uncertainty in the relationship between the child 
and the intended mother, and at the same time for it to permit practical 
appreciation protecting the overarching interests of the child.
The Court is aware that this procedure cannot cover all the practical cases 
because, for example, French law only allows adoption to parents who are 
married. In addition, margins of uncertainty remain in adoption procedures, 
relating to other interests worthy of protection: for example, as the French 
Ombudsman observed, the prior consent of the surrogate mother must be 
obtained (§ 57). However, the Court does not intend to dwell on whether 
French adoption law satisfies the principles set forth (§ 58), and expresses its 
hope, given the complexity of the issues raised by surrogacy arrangements, 
that the States will conclude international agreements to reach uniform 
regulations allowing these issues to be overcome, making reference in 
this regard to the draft developed by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (§ 59).
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1.3. Brief Reflection: the Absolute Primacy of the Best Interests 
of the Child
The Strasbourg Court’s effort to give a content to the principle of the best 
interests of the child is quite clear, especially when it specifies that decisions 
must have the purpose of giving the child a stable environment in which to 
develop with persons who take on responsibility for raising and loving him 
or her. The child must be able to receive everything that he or she expects 
from a ‘traditional’ family, so to speak, and that is essential even for those 
families that have a different origin.
2. The Constitutional Court’s Position on Surrogate 
Motherhood
The Constitutional Court’s decision No. 272 of 18 December 2017 originates 
from a question of constitutionality raised with regard to art. 263 of the 
Italian Civil Code in the part where it does not establish that the challenge 
to recognition of the minor child on the grounds of untruthfulness can be 
upheld only when it is in response to the best interests of the child.
However, the Constitutional Court used the occasion to advance deeper 
examination and also to set out its own position in the matter of surrogate 
motherhood10, given that the case originated from the registration – challenged 
by the public prosecutor11 – of the birth certificate established abroad and 
regarding a child born to Italian nationals who had resorted to this procedure 
through egg donation, and then obtained a birth certificate attesting to the 
legal parent-child relationship with both intended parents.
The Court observed that although the Italian legal system expresses a 
marked emphasis favouring the parent-child relationship’s conformity with 
the reality of procreation, ascertainment of the individual’s biological and 
genetic truth does not constitute ‘a value of absolute constitutional relevance 
that is such to be exempted from any balancing’ (§ 4.1). The interventions 
made by lawmakers, and the European and international framework in the 
matter of protecting the rights of children, emphasize the central importance 
of assessing the child’s interests when making choices regarding him or her. 
The Constitutional Court, citing its own case law, emphasized that it had to 
assess the child’s interests in the sphere of actions demolishing the parent-
child relationship.
10 That is to say the court, unlike what it had done in decision No. 162/2014, went beyond 
merely noting and confirming the surrogacy prohibition.
11 The appeal regarded only the recognition of maternity, while paternity raised no problems 
because the DNA test had confirmed the biological tie.
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From this perspective, the biological truth of procreation is an essential 
component of the child’s personal identity, that joins other components in 
defining the content of said identity: although a tendential correspondence 
between formal certainty and natural truth would be hoped for, the 
ascertainment of biological truth is part of the overall assessment brought 
before the judge, on a par with all the other elements that, along with it, 
contribute towards defining the child’s overall identity. Among the multiple 
components, it is also necessary to assess the interest in conserving the status 
already acquired.
On the other hand, genetic provenance is not an inescapable requirement 
of the family itself: that is to say, the gap between genetic identity and legal 
identity lies at the basis of adoption law, as an expression of a principle of 
responsibility of those who choose to be parents, giving rise to legitimate 
confidence in the continuity of the relationship. It is therefore necessary to 
look to the ‘concrete interests of the child’ (§ 4.2): the balancing between 
the need for truth of the status filiationis and the interests of the child 
requires making a comparative judgment between the interests underlying 
ascertainment of the truth of the status, and the consequences that this 
ascertainment may bring as to the child’s legal position. This is also the case 
when the question arises from a case of surrogate motherhood – forbidden in 
our legal system – because the unlawfulness of surrogacy does not on its own 
erase the interests of the child.
The Constitutional Court thus adopted an interpretative decision of 
dismissal, holding that the legal system already permits the judge to assess 
the interests of the child in maintaining his or her status when he/she is 
called upon to rule pursuant to art. 263 of the Italian Civil Code. In particular, 
the judge, in making his or her decision, must take account of a multitude 
of variables that the Constitutional Court made reference to: duration of the 
relationship established with the child, and the condition of identity already 
acquired; mode of conception and gestation; and the existence of legal 
instruments permitting the establishment of a legal bond with the contested 
parent and guaranteeing adequate protection for the child, for example 
through the institution of adoption in special cases.
The Constitutional Court therefore ruled out any automatic mechanism in 
the prevalence of one interest over the other, and confirmed the need for a 
careful assessment of the multiple values in play: nevertheless, it took pains 
to remark that the balancing must at any rate take account of the ‘high degree 
to which our legal system frowns upon surrogacy, which is prohibited by 
specific provision under criminal law’ (§ 4.3) since, shortly earlier, in an aside, 
the Court stressed that this practice ‘intolerably offends the dignity of the 
woman and profoundly undermines human relationships’ (§ 4.2).
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This pronouncement is absolutely in line with ECtHR case law, and in fact, 
in certain aspects, anticipated what the ECtHR expressed in its recent opinion, 
because if the judge’s evaluation does not lead to dismissing the challenge of 
the recognition of the child born through surrogacy, a path is pointed to – one 
that is certainly more articulated, and that may lead to establishing a parent-
child relationship with the intended mother when the intended father is also 
the biological one. This latter solution does not permit automatic recognition 
of the relationship between the child and the intended mother, as it must 
pass through the adoption procedure that, however, allows a case-by-case 
verification of the solution that best responds to the higher interests of the 
child. However, it is a procedure that can also give rise to new problems if the 
mother is deemed unfit upon the outcome of the verifications that are carried 
out, or if the surrogate mother refuses to grant the necessary consent.
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court’s ruling may also appear hypocritical 
(Pozzolo 2016, 107) or schizophrenic, in the sense that, although providing 
indications as to the legal instruments to be resorted to and thus making it 
possible to circumvent the prohibition on surrogacy, it is at the same time 
absolutely clear in frowning upon all forms of surrogacy (Angelini 2018). 
In fact, the final sentence of the ruling reaffirms – as if to make sure it is 
impressed in the reader’s mind – the great degree to which our legal system 
frowns upon surrogacy.
A reconstruction restoring consistency to the Constitutional Court’s 
arguments might be possible. In the child born through surrogacy, two 
dimensions of personal identity coexist: on the one hand, that connected to 
awareness of having been given birth to by a mother who began the gestation 
with the intention of renouncing her role. From the psychological standpoint, 
this is preordained abandonment (Salone 2016) and its explanation and 
acceptance therefore become even more complex for the child. On the other 
hand, there is the dimension that is more properly social: in the cultural and 
social setting (Ergas 2013, 120-121), this practice is frowned upon to a high 
degree, making it particularly complex to construct the inner ego, because the 
individual must grapple with the projection of his or her own image in the 
social environment. Therefore, the judge, in resolving the practical case, will 
have to consider whether the intended parents are actually able to help the 
child understand and accept his or her own complex identity (Matucci 2018). 
It is as if the Constitutional Court had wished to give accountability to the 
judge who, in taking a decision, will have to carefully assess this complexity, 
since it is necessary to safeguard the child’s construction of a balanced inner 
ego.
The Court thus shows that it fully agrees with the prohibition of this practice 
under criminal law, given the values at play: however, it also manifests the 
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burden of having to grapple with the regulatory void. In fact, Law No. 40/2004 
neglected to deal with the problems arising in the event of violation of the 
prohibition, and, as a consequence, the task of bridging this gap falls upon the 
judges, at first instance, and then upon the Constitutional Court when doubts 
arise as to compatibility with the Constitution’s values.
Precisely the absence of an adequate regulation can explain the reason 
behind the choice of an interpretative sentence of dismissal instead of a 
decision of upholding or manipulation: the topic is quite complex and the 
Constitutional Court intended to solve the individual practical case before it, 
pending the intervention of lawmakers to balance and deal with the multiple 
related issues.
3. The Recent Decision of the United Sections of the 
Italian Court of Cassation Regarding Homosexual 
Couples Making Recourse to Surrogacy
The recent ruling of the united sections of the Italian Court of Cassation12, 
while adopting a more cautious and restrictive interpretation, is most 
certainly in line with the ECtHR’s rulings and the indications of the 
Constitutional Court.
3.1. Background
The question arose from the refusal to recognize the validity of a measure 
issued by a court in a foreign country that attributed to two minors the 
status of children of a member of a homosexual couple with whom they had 
no biological relationship. The two children were generated from gametes 
supplied by the other member of the couple – who was already declared their 
parent with a prior measure duly registered in Italy – with the cooperation of 
two women, one of whom had donated her eggs while the other, by virtue of 
an agreement validly executed in accordance with the foreign country’s law, 
had carried the children, waiving in advance any rights over the children.
3.2. The Intended Parent with No Biological Link to the Child 
Can Resort Only to Adoption
The Italian Court of Cassation affirms that surrogacy prohibition expressed 
in art. 12, paragraph 6, of Law n. 40/2004, constitutes the balancing point 
currently achieved at the legislative level in protecting the different 
12 Court of Cassation, united sections, decision of 08 May 2019, No. 12193.
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fundamental interests taken into consideration in this matter. Therefore, it 
cannot be simply held that the consequences of violating the prescriptions 
and prohibitions imposed by the aforementioned law, attributable to adults 
who have made recourse to this fecundation procedure that is unlawful in 
Italy, cannot be borne by the child.
In fact, according to the Court, this interest is destined to weaken in the 
event of recourse to surrogacy because the prohibition of this procreative 
technique becomes the necessary link in the chain between the regulations 
governing medically assisted procreation and the general ones governing the 
parent-child relationship, marking the limit beyond which the principle of 
personal responsibility founded upon the consent given to the aforementioned 
practice ceases to act, and the favor veritatis justifying the primacy of genetic 
and biological identity becomes once again operative.
However, according to the Italian Court of Cassation, this primacy does 
not necessarily result in cancelling the interests of the child, because his/
her protection, as the Constitutional Court13 has specified, requires moving 
beyond the rigid true/false dichotomy, with more complex variables to be taken 
account of, such as for example the existence of legal instruments suitable for 
permitting the establishment of a legal bond with the intended parent that, 
although different from that of art. 8 of Law No. 40/2004, guarantees the child 
adequate protection. In this regard, the Court makes reference to its own 
case law in the matter of adoptions in special cases, pursuant to art. 44, Law 
No. 184/1983: starting from the interests of the child in having his or her 
bonds with other parties recognized, this institution makes it possible in fact 
to safeguard the continuity of the relationship of affection and upbringing.
According to the Italian Court of Cassation, this solution is absolutely in line 
with the principles enshrined by international conventions in the matter of 
protecting children’s rights. In fact, the ECtHR has for some time affirmed that 
States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation both for the purposes of deciding 
whether or not to authorize this practice, and as concerns determining the 
effects to be legally attached to it, noting that an essential facet of individuals’ 
identity is in play, while at any rate recognizing the legitimacy of the aims of 
protecting the child and the birth mother pursued by imposing the prohibition 
in question.
Referring to the Mennesson and Labassee decisions, the Court of Cassation 
underscores how the failure to recognize the parent-child relationship is 
inevitably destined to impact the child’s family life. However, as the ECtHR 
specified, there is no violation of the right to respect for family life where 
the possibility of leading an existence comparable to that of other families 
13 Constitutional Court, decision of 18 December 2017, No. 272 (§ 4.3).
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is tangibly ensured, finding only a violation of the right to respect for their 
private life, in connection with the harm to personal identity, that may derive 
from one of the intended parents coinciding with the child’s biological parent.
The Italian Court of Cassation consequently deduces that these violations 
are not committed when, as in this case, the parent-child relationship with the 
biological parent is not questioned, but only the one with the intended parent, 
the refusal to recognize which does not preclude the child’s introduction into 
the parent couple’s family unit, or his or her access to the legal treatment 
attributable to the legal parent-child relationship accorded without dispute 
with regard to the other parent (§ 13.3).
In other words, the Italian Court of Cassation aligns with the ECtHR’s 
case law and finds that the existence of a genetic or biological link with the 
child is the limit beyond which the identification of the instruments most 
suited for granting legal significance to the parental relationship is remitted 
to the discretion of the State’s lawmakers, compatibly with the interests 
involved in the case, and without prejudice to the obligation to ensure 
protection comparable to that ordinarily attributable to the legal parent-child 
relationship. In our legal system, this need can be met by the institution of 
adoption in special cases, since the provisions of Law No. 184/1983 equate the 
adopted child’s position with the status of the child born from wedlock.
The Italian Court of Cassation concludes by finding, therefore, that 
recognition of the effectiveness of the foreign judicial measure accepting the 
parent-child relationship between a child born abroad through surrogacy 
and the intended parent with Italian nationality is not possible given the 
prohibition against surrogacy (art. 12, paragraph 6, Law No. 40/2004), which 
must be qualified as a principle of public order because it is established 
to protect such fundamental rights as the human dignity of the surrogate 
mother and the institution of adoption. According to the Court, these values, 
in the balancing made by lawmakers, are not unreasonably held to prevail 
over the interests of the child, and the court cannot replace them with its own 
assessment, also because the legal system affords the possibility of giving 
importance to the parental relationship through recourse to such other legal 
instruments as, for example, adoption in special cases (§ 13.4).
3.3. Some Reflections: the Caution of the Italian Court of 
Cassation
Examination of case law shows differences with regard to reconstructing 
the relationship between the best interests of the child and the principle of 
public order for the purposes of defining the parent-child relationship.
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The ECtHR considers the best interests of the child as a counter-limit to 
the principle of public order – a reconstruction that may also be understood 
given this court’s function. For the Constitutional Court, the public order 
limit is an element that joins others in contributing to the complex definition 
of the best interests of the child: therefore, violation of mandatory rules of 
domestic law does not necessarily imply losing the status recognized abroad. 
Lastly, for the Italian Court of Cassation, the protection of public order, in the 
case of violating the surrogacy prohibition, results in weakening the interest 
in maintaining the legal parent-child relationship lawfully acquired abroad. 
While favor veritatis is again operative, it is also necessary to safeguard the 
best interests of the child in preserving the established bonds of affection.
In spite of its reference to the decision by the Constitutional Court, the 
united sections thus expressed a greatly different and more restrictive 
interpretation.
In fact, the Constitutional Court, by remitting the assessment of the practical 
case to the judge, found that the challenge of the recognition of the child 
born through surrogacy could be dismissed when, while taking account of a 
multitude of data – including the unlawfulness of this procreative method –, 
the child’s interest in conserving the acquired legal parent-child relationship 
appears to prevail. The Italian Court of Cassation, however, states that, in 
the event of surrogacy, the interest in conserving said status acquired abroad 
is destined to weaken, due precisely to the absolute prohibition established 
in our legal system. For the intended parent, when no biological link can be 
asserted, the only possible way is adoption in special cases – an instrument 
that, as the ECtHR confirms, still makes it possible to safeguard the child’s 
interest and the established bond of affection, in full compliance with the 
margins of discretion available to each State.
It does not appear that this restrictive interpretation has been conditioned 
by the fact that the events involved a homosexual couple14: in any event this 
cannot be gleaned from the ruling, which speaks of intended parent with or 
without a biological link to the child.
Rather, it would appear that the Italian Court of Cassation has wished to 
reduce the weight of the decisions that would otherwise have fallen to the 
individual judges and, in the presence of an absolute prohibition present in 
our legal system that does not allow being overcome by pure interpretation, 
has opted for an already time-tested institution that, by its own articulation, 
14 On the contrary, Winkler and Schappo (2019, 384-387) believe that the Court of Cassation 
failed to give voice to children born via surrogacy abroad and living with parents of the 
same sex.
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permits the necessary case-by-case ascertainment pending the necessary 
intervention by lawmakers.
Final Observations
Developing case law shows how biological truth is an essential component 
of the individual15, but not the only one, because other components must 
also be considered.
Precisely this evolution marks an increasingly clear difficulty in bringing 
‘new families’ within the ‘traditional’ one – the family unified in linear 
descent – because the inviolable rights of individuals may inevitably be 
deprived of adequate protection, or be sacrificed.
Beyond the need for common principles at the international level, this 
makes it increasingly clear that our lawmakers must deal with the theme 
of surrogate motherhood because an absolute prohibition, established 
incidentally in the sphere of regulating medically assisted procreation, may 
also raise doubts as to constitutionality.
The uniform regulation of all cases of surrogacy raises doubts as to 
compliance with the principle of equality, not only in the case in which 
lawmakers might, in the future, opt for full legitimacy, but also in the present 
time, because, for example, there is no distinction between paid surrogacy 
and unpaid, purely altruistic surrogacy, that is to say when this practice does 
not result in commodifying the human body, but is a procedure concretely 
expressing the solidarity of one person towards another or others.
Clearly, an opening in this sense requires a regulation governing the many 
interests worthy of protection: first of all those of the child because, for 
example, his or her interest in seeking his or her own identity cannot be 
offset by the fact that he or she could be born only through the surrogacy 
procedure that was carried out.
In any event, the opening to altruistic surrogacy would raise problems 
given that it might not be easy to verify the exchange of compensation 
between the parties beyond bearing expenses. Moreover, even in countries 
where altruistic surrogacy is allowed, we have inevitably witnessed the rise 
of a market connected to brokers, agencies, and clinics that may end up 
debasing the surrogate mother’s dignity through the commodification of her 
role.
15 In this regard, it suffices to consider Italian Constitutional Court decision of 22 November 
2013, No. 278, in the matter of adoption, which recognized the adopted person’s right of 
access to his or her origins even in the case in which the mother has expressed her desire to 
remain anonymous. In fact, the need to know one’s origins, as the ECtHR has stated, is one 
of the facets of personality that can condition a person’s intimacy and relational life (§ 4).
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To thwart this, there are those (Sgorbati 2016) who suggest limiting this 
possibility only to cases in which the intended couple and the surrogate 
mother have a family relationship or at least a bond of affection. While 
containing (but not totally excluding) the risk of commodification, possible 
doubts of constitutional legitimacy would still be raised, because it would 
preclude those who, for mere altruistic purposes, wish to perform this gesture 
of solidarity. However, the most adequate form of protection appears to be 
requiring that the child be made aware of his or her origins, thus excluding 
the possibility for the surrogate mother to remain anonymous. In this way, 
full respect would be shown for the generative component of human nature, 
and for that bond that is still established between the surrogate mother and 
the child during pregnancy, and that will then have to be processed by the 
child in building his or her own ego.
Moreover, in spite of the altruistic spirit, it would be necessary to fully 
define the entire procedure, taking all the possibilities into account: from the 
surrogate mother changing her mind by wishing to interrupt the pregnancy 
or to recognize the child as her own after the pregnancy is brought to term, 
to one or both intended parents changing their mind during gestation, or 
after it, or if the child suffers from some disease.
In any event, lawmakers must necessarily deal – in this case as well 
through a non-uniform regulation differentiated with respect to the diversity 
of situations that may take place – with the consequences of paid surrogacy 
for the child, the mother who carried the child to term, and the intended 
parents.
In fact, it must also not be forgotten that the principles currently stated in 
case law in many instances make it possible to circumvent the regulations 
governing adoption. We may consider the cases in which a married couple 
does not possess the prerequisites (even only the age requirements) for 
undertaking this process, and consequently decides to rely on surrogacy 
using the male spouse’s gametes, thus increasing the growing phenomenon 
of procreative tourism, often to countries poorer than that of the intended 
parents (Bromfield and Smith Rotabi 2014).
Moreover, the possibility of being able to become parents of a new-born 
baby instead of an abandoned child who already has traumas to process 
may be seen as an easier solution to deal with, in the belief that the right to 
identity of the child born through surrogacy, and the difficulties he or she 
will have to process during growth, connected with the complexity of his 
or her own status, are something that is not current, or at any rate easier to 
deal with.
In other words, the current situation already risks affording protection 
to the ‘right to have a child at all costs,’ thus transforming the child born 
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through surrogacy from a subject of rights to an object of a right belonging 
to others.
All these indicators confirm the need for an intervention by lawmakers 
aimed not only at regulating the consequences of surrogacy carried out 
in violation of the prohibitions established in the legal system, but also at 
preventing these cases and, at any rate, revising the regulations governing 
adoption in such a way as to facilitate access to it, in order to protect the 
interests – no less worthy of protection – of abandoned children.
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